This commentary focuses on three aspects of Nannini’s paper: 1) the parallel between Einstein’s theory of relativity and the new science of the mind/brain; 2) the Cartesian characterization of non-reductionist positions in the philosophy of mind; 3) the alleged illusory status of consciousness, free will and the self. We suggest, first, that Nannini overstates the success of cognitive neuroscience; second, that non-reductionism is not necessarily a Cartesian position; and third, that the neurocognitive science data do not show or even suggest, that consciousness, free will and the self are illusory phenomena.

Analogies, Non-Reductionism and Illusions. Three remarks on Nannini

Di Francesco M;Tomasetta Alfredo
2015

Abstract

This commentary focuses on three aspects of Nannini’s paper: 1) the parallel between Einstein’s theory of relativity and the new science of the mind/brain; 2) the Cartesian characterization of non-reductionist positions in the philosophy of mind; 3) the alleged illusory status of consciousness, free will and the self. We suggest, first, that Nannini overstates the success of cognitive neuroscience; second, that non-reductionism is not necessarily a Cartesian position; and third, that the neurocognitive science data do not show or even suggest, that consciousness, free will and the self are illusory phenomena.
reductionism; consciousness; self
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12076/876
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