The current philosophical discussion on the self and consciousness is characterized by a contrast or dilemma between the no-self (eliminativist) perspective, on the one hand, and the arguably naïve account that takes the self as a robust entity, on the other. in order to solve the dilemma, in this paper we suggest restoring a robust theory of the subject based on a bottom-up approach (fully consonant with contemporary neurocognitive science) together with a pluralistic reading of the nature of the science of the mental.
Real selves? Subjectivity and the subpersonal mind
Di Francesco M;
2014-01-01
Abstract
The current philosophical discussion on the self and consciousness is characterized by a contrast or dilemma between the no-self (eliminativist) perspective, on the one hand, and the arguably naïve account that takes the self as a robust entity, on the other. in order to solve the dilemma, in this paper we suggest restoring a robust theory of the subject based on a bottom-up approach (fully consonant with contemporary neurocognitive science) together with a pluralistic reading of the nature of the science of the mental.File in questo prodotto:
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