The author of “Evidence, Explanation, Enhanced Indispensability” advances a criticism to the Enhanced Indispensability Argument and the use of Infer- ence to the Best Explanation in order to draw ontological conclusions from mathe- matical explanations in science. His argument relies on the availability of equivalent though competing explanations, and a pluralist stance on explanation. I discuss whether pluralism emerges as a stable position, and focus here on two main points: whether cases of equivalent explanations have been actually offered, and which ontological consequences should follow from these.

Equivalent Explanations and Mathematical Realism. Reply to ‘Evidence, Explanation, and Enhanced Indispensability

Sereni A
2016

Abstract

The author of “Evidence, Explanation, Enhanced Indispensability” advances a criticism to the Enhanced Indispensability Argument and the use of Infer- ence to the Best Explanation in order to draw ontological conclusions from mathe- matical explanations in science. His argument relies on the availability of equivalent though competing explanations, and a pluralist stance on explanation. I discuss whether pluralism emerges as a stable position, and focus here on two main points: whether cases of equivalent explanations have been actually offered, and which ontological consequences should follow from these.
Enhanced indispensability argument; Mathematical explanation; Mathematical realism
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12076/258
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