A Logic for Using Information

Logics of information have abounded in the last two decades. A major point of conceptual and formal difference among various such logics has been represented by the interaction they model between information and truth. Floridi’s logic of 'being informed' defines semantic information as the truthful basis for knowledge; Allo’s revisitation of it restraints this relation from the agent’s perspective; Primiero’s logic for 'becoming informed' focuses on information as denoting assertibility conditions, whereas truth is only granted by their verification. The present article extends the debate to include aspects originating in semiotics and pragmatics to the study of information, in particular with respect to computational systems. We stress the role of the different informational users in exchanging and determining validity conditions for information and formalize a weighted multi-agent modal logic for 'using information'. We present both a semantics and axiomatic systems, prove standard meta-theoretical results and show which fragments correspond to different interpretations of use of the computational systems under interpretation.