Talk of “turns” is widespread in analytic philosophy—the linguistic turn, the cognitive turn, the naturalistic turn, and so forth. With the title of this special issue, we would like to capture an important trend that is currently emerging in the philosophy of mind. Looking back at what analytic philosophy was in the ’80s, one can clearly see that a theoretical attitude dominated the debate over minds, and in particular over mental content and intentionality. The attitude was that intentionality and content could—and should—be naturalised. That is, analysed in non-semantic, non-mental and non-contentful terms. To use one of Fodor’s catchphrases, the zeitgeist declared that “if intentionality is real, it really must be something else” (Fodor 1987: 97). Accordingly, philosophers were called to take up the task of discovering…
Special Issue: The Phenomenological Turn in Analytic Philosophy of Mind, Argumenta
M. Facchin;G. Zanotti;Piredda;Di Francesco
2024-01-01
Abstract
Talk of “turns” is widespread in analytic philosophy—the linguistic turn, the cognitive turn, the naturalistic turn, and so forth. With the title of this special issue, we would like to capture an important trend that is currently emerging in the philosophy of mind. Looking back at what analytic philosophy was in the ’80s, one can clearly see that a theoretical attitude dominated the debate over minds, and in particular over mental content and intentionality. The attitude was that intentionality and content could—and should—be naturalised. That is, analysed in non-semantic, non-mental and non-contentful terms. To use one of Fodor’s catchphrases, the zeitgeist declared that “if intentionality is real, it really must be something else” (Fodor 1987: 97). Accordingly, philosophers were called to take up the task of discovering…I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
