In Thin objects: an abstractionist account (Oxford University Press, 2018), Øystein Linnebo claims that ‘mathematical objects are thin in the sense that very little is required for their existence’. Linnebo articulates his view in an abstractionist manner: according to Linnebo, the truth of the right-hand side of a Fregean abstraction principle, which states that two items stand in a given equivalence relation, is sufficient for the truth of its left-hand side, which states that the same abstract object is associated to both items. This special issue contains nine articles discussing different aspects of Linnebo's book. In this introduction, we provide an opinionated introduction to the Special Issue and an overview of the contributions.
Thin objects: An overview
Zanetti, Luca
2023-01-01
Abstract
In Thin objects: an abstractionist account (Oxford University Press, 2018), Øystein Linnebo claims that ‘mathematical objects are thin in the sense that very little is required for their existence’. Linnebo articulates his view in an abstractionist manner: according to Linnebo, the truth of the right-hand side of a Fregean abstraction principle, which states that two items stand in a given equivalence relation, is sufficient for the truth of its left-hand side, which states that the same abstract object is associated to both items. This special issue contains nine articles discussing different aspects of Linnebo's book. In this introduction, we provide an opinionated introduction to the Special Issue and an overview of the contributions.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.