Logic has traditionally been considered a normative discipline in that it is taken to guide us in deductive reasoning. There is currently an intense debate over how exactly logic's normative role on reasoning should be conceived. There is likewise an intense debate over virtues and weaknesses of logical pluralism, namely the idea that there are rival and yet in some sense equally correct logics. This special issue aims at bringing these two debates together by discussing a number of questions that have not yet been extensively explored, such as: In what sense and to what extent is logic normative for reasoning? If, as the logical pluralist would have it, there is a plurality of equally correct notions of logical consequence, what norms govern deductive inference? How does that affect logical and mathematical practices? Is logical pluralism ultimately a stable position?
Preface to Special Issue Logical Pluralism and Normativity, INQUIRY
Andrea Sereni
2020-01-01
Abstract
Logic has traditionally been considered a normative discipline in that it is taken to guide us in deductive reasoning. There is currently an intense debate over how exactly logic's normative role on reasoning should be conceived. There is likewise an intense debate over virtues and weaknesses of logical pluralism, namely the idea that there are rival and yet in some sense equally correct logics. This special issue aims at bringing these two debates together by discussing a number of questions that have not yet been extensively explored, such as: In what sense and to what extent is logic normative for reasoning? If, as the logical pluralist would have it, there is a plurality of equally correct notions of logical consequence, what norms govern deductive inference? How does that affect logical and mathematical practices? Is logical pluralism ultimately a stable position?I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
